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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship of managerial bonuses and profit maximization is interesting both from an 
economic and a managerial points of view. On one hand, we see that using an adequate 
compensation scheme, the owners can commit themself to a market strategy which can 
increase their profits, compared to results achieved through direct profit maximization. 
Secondly, it can serve as a guideline for the comparison of different compensation plans. 
 
The seminal articles in this area are Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas 
(1987). The Cournot case was discussed in Jansen et al. (2009), while the Bertrand case was 
dealt with in Jansen et al. (2007). We are investigating the issue of managerial incentives in a 
spatial Bertrand model, in the vein of Hotelling (1929). Our contribution is showing that 
progressive managerial bonuses can increase profits in a spatial Bertrand competition, and 
furthermore they can help collusion. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
We investigate a spatial Bertrand duopoly. The two firms are located at points 0 and 1 
respectively, and the line segment between the two locations is uniformly populated by 
consumers. Both firms have constant marginal costs, which is normalized to 0. A consumer 
located at point x ϵ [0, 1] buying the product of firm i (i=1, 2) has to pay the price set by firm i 
plus the transportation cost t per unit distance: pi + t|(li − 1) − x|, where li ϵ {0, 1} is the 
location of firm i. Each consumer buys at most one good. We further assume that the 
valuations of the customers are sufficiently high, so that in equilibrium each consumer is 
buying one good. The firms’ decisions are made by their respective managers, who want to 
maximize their own salary.1 Their salaries in turn depend on the performance of the firm and 
the contract between the manager and the owner of the firm. We consider three types of 
contracts: 
 
• Profit maximization. The manager’s salary depends solely on the profit of the firm, 
thus they maximize the firm’s profit function: πi. 
• Flat bonus. The manager’s salary depends not only on the profit of the firm, but the 
unit profit margin as well, thus they maximize the following function: πi + λipi, 
where pi is the normalized price, i.e. the unit profit margin and λi is a coefficient set 
by the owner. It can be shown that in our model this is equivalent to other types of 
bonuses studied in the literature: a quantity bonus or a market share bonus. See the 
appendix for details. 
• Progressive bonus. The manager’s salary depends not only on the profit of the firm, 
but also receives a progressive reward based on the profit margin, thus they 
maximize the following function:2 πi + λipi2. 
 
We omitted the discussion of relative profit maximization, since it is easy to see that in this 
context the optimal contract offered by the owner would reward higher profits of the 
competitor, thus it is unfeasible.  
 
For later comparisons, we reiterate a well-known result: If both firms are maximizing profits 
(i.e. if both managers are given profit maximizing contracts), then the profit maximizing price 
for firm i is pi = (p-i + t)/2, where p-i  is the price set by the other firm, then both firms charge t 
and the profits of both firms are t/2. 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
If the manager of firm i is given a flat bonus contract, the following price maximizes their 
salary (conditional on the bonus coefficient and the price charged by the other firm): pi = [p-i + 
t(1 + 2λi)]/2, where -i≠ i. Using this, we can state the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 1. If the manager of firm i is given a flat bonus contract and the manager of firm -
i is given a profit maximizing contract then the respective prices and profits are: 
  
    pi = (3t)/2,    p-i = (5t)/4 
    πi = (9t)/16,   π-i = (25t)/32 
 
Proposition 2. If the managers of both firms are given a flat bonus contract then the respective 
prices and profits are: 
 
    pi = 2t,    p-i = 2t 
    πi = t,    π-i = t 
 
If the manager of firm i is given a progressive bonus contract, the following price maximizes 
their salary (conditional on the bonus coefficient and the price charged by the other firm): pi = 
(p-i + t)/[2(1 − λit)]. That leads us to three further propositions: 
 
1 This salary might consist of a fixed part, a commission proportional to the profit and some kind of bonus. 
2 To capture the progressiveness of the bonus schedule, we used a strictly convex function of the profit margin. 
                                                 
Proposition 3. If the manager of firm i is given a progressive bonus contract and the manager 
of firm -i is given a profit maximizing contract then the respective prices and profits are: 
 
    pi = (3t)/2,    p-i = (5t)/4 
    πi = (9t)/16,   π-i = (25t)/32 
 
Proposition 4. If the manager of firm i is given a progressive bonus contract and the manager 
of firm -i is given a flat bonus contract then the respective prices and profits are: 
 
    pi = (7t)/3,   p-i = (5t)/2 
    πi = (49t)/36,  π-i = (25t)/24 
 
Proposition 5. If the managers of both firms are given a progressive bonus contract then the 
respective prices and profits are: 
 
    pi = pcoll,   p-i = pcoll 
    πi = πcoll,   π-i = πcoll 
 
In this case, no upper boundary on consumer valuations would mean no upper boundary on 
optimal prices; therefore with a more realistic assumption of bounded valuations both firms 
would charge the collusive price and earn the collusive profits. 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
Though it is quite unlikely that real-life contracts would incorporate the square of some 
profitability measure, it can be practically emulated by offering contacts with profitability 
targets and assign a progressively increasing reward. We have seen that considering the 
described set of strategies it is a weakly dominant strategy, thus in some cases it can increase 
the firm’s profits. Furthermore if the owners of both firms offer this type of contract, it can 
facilitate collusion in the industry. 
 
5. APPENDIX 
 
The equivalence of profitability, quantity and market share bonuses 
 
The manager of firm i, if offered a quantity bonus, maximizes πi + λiqi, where qi is the number 
of units sold. It is trivial that qi is also the market share of firm i in this setup, so we only have 
to show that this compensation system leads to the same result as the bonus system proposed 
in the article. The price that maximizes the payoff to the manager under the quantity bonus 
system is: pi = (-λi + p-i + t)/2. 
 
Now assume that choosing λi = α maximizes the payoff to the owner. If the manager would 
have had a profitability bonus, so the manager would choose price pi = [p-i + t(1 + 2λi)]/2.  In 
the latter case, choosing λi = -α/(2t) produces the same outcome as that in the case of the 
quantity bonus. 
 
Assume that in the profitability bonus case, choosing λi = β maximizes the payoff to the 
owner. An owner, having offered the quantity bonus contract, could replicate the same 
outcome by choosing λi = -β/(2t).  
 
We can see that the optimal lambdas have an opposite sign, thus formulating the contract as a 
quantity or market share bonus may not be feasible. 
 
The managerial decisions 
The flat bonus case 
 
The manager of firm i maximizes  
 
Ui(pi)= [(-pi +p-i +t)/(2t)]pi +λipi, 
 
so the first-order condition is  
 
∂Ui(pi)/∂pi = λi − (pi)/(2t) + (-pi +p-i +t)/(2t) = 0. 
 
 
The progressive bonus case 
 
The manager of firm i maximizes  
 
Ui(pi)= [(-pi +p-i +t)/(2t)]pi +λipi2, 
 
so the first-order condition is  
 
∂Ui(pi)/∂pi = 2λi pi − (pi)/(2t) + (-pi +p-i +t)/(2t) = 0. 
 
 
The optimal incentives 
Flat bonus and profit maximization 
 
Assume that the manager of firm i is working under a flat bonus contract, while the manager 
of firm -i maximizes profits. In that case the managers choose the following prices: 
 
   pi = (3 + 4λi)t/3,   p-i = (3 + 2λi)t/3 
 
Thus the owner of firm i maximizes their profit according to the first-order condition: 
 
∂πi/∂pi = (3 − 8λi)t/9 = 0. 
 
hence 
 
λi = 3/8 . 
 
Both owners offer flat bonus 
 
If both owners offer flat bonus contracts to the managers, then the managers choose the 
following prices: 
 
   pi = (3 + 4λi + 2λ-i)t/3,  p-i = (3 + 2λi + 4λ-i)t/3 
 
Thus the owner of firm i maximizes their profit according to the first-order condition: 
 
∂πi/∂pi = (3 − 8λi + 2λ-i)t/9 = 0. 
 
hence 
 
λi = (3 + 2λ-i)/8 . 
 
Using a similar condition derived for firm -i, the optimal coefficients can be calculated: 
 
λi = λ-i = 1/2 . 
 
Progressive bonus and profit maximization 
 
Assume that the manager of firm i is working under a progressive bonus contract, while the 
manager of firm -i maximizes profits. In that case the managers choose the following prices: 
 
   pi = 3t/(3 − 8λit),   p-i = (3t − 4λit2)/(3 − 8λit) 
 
Thus the owner of firm i maximizes their profit according to the first-order condition: 
 
∂πi/∂pi = 18t2(1 − 8λit)/(3 − 8λit)3 = 0 
 
hence 
λi = 1/(8t) . 
 
Progressive bonus and flat bonus 
 
Assume that the manager of firm i is working under a progressive bonus contract, while the 
manager of firm -i receives a flat bonus. In that case the managers choose the following 
prices: 
 
 pi = (3t + 2λ-it)/(3 − 8λit),  p-i = (3t +4λ-i − 4λit2 − 8λiλ-it2)/(3 − 8λit) 
 
Thus the owner of firm i maximizes their profit according to the first-order condition: 
 
∂πi/∂pi = 2(3 + 2λ-i)2t2(1 − 8λit)/(3 − 8λit)3 = 0 
 
hence 
 
λi = 1/(8t) . 
 
The owner of firm -i maximizes their profit according to the first-order condition: 
 
∂π-i/∂p-i = t{3 − 4λit − 8λ-i[1 + 2λit(-3 + 4λit)]}/(3 − 8λit)2 = 0 
 
hence 
 
λ-i = (3 − 4λit)/[8(1 − 6λit + 8λi2t2)] , 
 
which – after the substitution of the previously calculated value for λi – gives: 
 
λ-i = 5/6 . 
 
Both owners offer progressive bonus 
 
If both owners offer progressive bonus contracts to the managers, then – still assuming 
unbounded consumer valuations – the managers choose the following prices: 
 
pi = (3t − 4λ-it
2)/(3 − 8λit − 8λ-it + 16λiλ-it
2),  
p-i = (3t − 4λit
2)/(3 − 8λit − 8λ-it + 16λiλ-it
2) 
 
Thus the owner of firm i maximizes their profit according to the first-order condition: 
 
∂π-i/∂p-i = 2t2(3 − 4λ-it)2[1+ 8λit(2λ-it −1)]3/(3 − 8λit − 8λ-it + 16λiλ-it2) = 0 
 
hence 
 
λi = 1/[8t(1 − 2λ-it)] , 
 
Using a similar condition derived for firm j, the optimal coefficients can be calculated: 
 
λi = λ-i = 1/4 . 
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